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Generating Law: Learning How to Take Care of
What One Has Started
Thomas D. Eisele
The middle span of life is under the dominance of the universal human need and
strength which I have come to subsume under the term generativity. I have said
that in this stage a man and a woman must have defined for themselves what
and whom they have come to care for, what they care to do well, and how they
plan to take care of what they have started and created.
–ERIK ERIKSON1

Starting to Practice Law
After graduating from law school, I started practicing law with a Chicago law firm
comprising more than eighty attorneys. The firm was collegial, not cutthroat. Most
of the firm’s partners and associates with whom I came in contact (with some of
whom, I worked closely) actively sought to help me turn myself into a competent
lawyer. This would seem to be a recipe for professional success, but for me it
was not.
I found, instead, that I was struggling. I wanted to be a success—who does not? I
tried very hard to be a competent professional. Yet I found my initial attempts at
the work that I was asked to do, to be disconcertingly difficult and the results
distressingly poor. Mostly, I did average legal work of marginal quality It was
nothing to be proud of. Where was I going wrong, and why?
I could do the basics of legal research and writing: I located the cases, found the
applicable statutes, made some progress with the rules and administrative
regulations, and after a fashion I could put together a reasonable memorandum
of law, or draft a passable complaint or answer. But little or none of my legal work
breathed life. Much of it came from form books, or from the available models of
previous work done by others in the law firm; and the instruments or documents
that I accordingly drafted remained theirs, not mine. The instruments that I was
drafting, and the memos that I was writing, and the advisory letters that I was
trying to craft, were not so much mute as they were forgeries: to the extent that
they spoke, it was not with my voice, but someone else’s (usually, that of a ghost
from the law firm’s past). Or, worse yet, the legal instruments that I created
enunciated their words in a nonhuman voice, some kind of mechanical
vocalization which seemed to me to represent a deadened form of the law.
Nothing vital came out of my legal work: not the law, not the problem at hand, not
the document or instrument that I was crafting. And certainly nothing of myself—
not my persona, not my mind—was expressed in my legal writings.

Then, out of the blue, a fresh copy of The Legal Imagination 2 came to me, and
the book changed my relationship to the law. Jim White’s book had been sent to
me by a law review with which I had had no prior contact. The law review invited
me to read and review White’s book, an invitation that I accepted with alacrity.
Quizzical at the large volume bound in rich yellow covers, I began perusing it,
first skeptically, then with increasing interest and excitement. Quickly, a new legal
landscape unfolded, stretching before me. This land of the law was not a country
of settled forms and ancient documents, to be replicated and reduced to
repetitive iterations of the same old solutions to the same old problems. No, it
was a more vivid geography confronting me. Here, problems of, say, how to
approach a traffic accident, or what the meaning and significance of the death
penalty might be in today’s world, or how to sort out the claims between
participants in a bar fight, or how to handle someone’s dying (perhaps a person
very close to me, perhaps even myself)—all of these questions (and many more)
were posed to me, and left with me. How would I deal with them?
To help me think this responsibility through, there were poems, and historical
accounts, and some literary criticism, and political tracts, and philosophical
writings, and short stories, and humorous tales, and tragic odes, and more—put
together attentively, in such a way so as to resonate within their juxtapositions.
The writers of these texts had been confronted with problems typical of human
experience in this confusing world of ours. Here were the texts that they
managed to fashion in response to those problems, those mysteries, those
opportunities, those trials. Now, what was I to make of these resources, these
achievements, in view of the fact that there always exists the ever-attractive
option that humans have to stand mute in the face of their experiences and
frustrations, or to live in denial of them?
Two passages on death come to mind here. In Henry Adams’s Education, he
recalls his wrenching conversion from innocence to experience, when his sister
died of tetanus. “The last lesson—the sum and term of education—began then.”3
Before this experience, Henry had only seen the “sugar-coating” that nature, that
life, shows to youth. Now the horror of human mortality confronted him. And he
rejects it. “Society, being immortal, could put on immortality at will. Adams, being
mortal, felt only the mortality.” 4 His sister died “after ten days of fiendish torture,”
torn by convulsions as her muscles grew rigid, yet her mind remained conscious
of everything around her. For Henry Adams, there is no consolation. He is angry,
bitter, at his sister’s fate. “She faced death, as women mostly do, bravely and
even gaily, racked slowly to unconsciousness, but yielding only to violence, as a
soldier sabred in battle. For many thousands of years, on these hills and plains,
Nature had gone on sabring men and women with the same air of sensual
pleasure.” 5
Contrast with this passage, one from Macauley’s History of England, where he
recounts the execution of Monmouth, who had failed at trying to overthrow the
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Catholic king, James II. “The hour drew near; all hope was over; and Monmouth
had passed from pusillanimous fear to the apathy of despair.... He alone was
unmoved.” 6 There is in Monmouth’s response to his own death another form of
human determination, related to Adams’s rejection of our fate at the hands of
nature, yet different. Monmouth becomes resigned to his own mortality. “I will
make no speeches,” Monmouth exclaimed; instead, he bade the executioner,
“Do not hack me as you did my Lord Russell.... My servant will give you some
more gold if you do the work well.” 7 Monmouth’s forlorn hope at this stage is not
for survival, but for surcease.
In many of us, these conflicting emotions of bitter rejection and subdued
resignation reside side by side. We reject our mortality just as much as we are
resigned to it. In many of us, the task of anticipating our own deaths is
unimaginable, yet unavoidable. Faced with such conflicting emotions and
concerns, we in the land of the law have only the estate plan with which to work.
Enter the testator’s last will and testament. And enter the lawyer entrusted with
the task of contending with our humanly mixed emotions. These are natural
human emotions with which every lawyer who has ever drafted a will or a trust
document, has had to contend—and to satisfy, if not to silence.
As it turned out, the readings in The Legal Imagination were not solutions to my
problems of how to turn myself into a competent lawyer. Rather, the readings
composing White’s book simply made my problems more pointed, or more
poignant. The readings that White had put together in a certain sequence
showed me slices of human life, varieties of experience and expression, possible
choices grounded within an inherited body of some profession’s literature; but
they did not guide me to a solution of the problems posed to me. They led me to
experience the problems as my own, and they challenged me to find an
adequate response, something commensurate with the weight and heft of the
issues and concerns with which life presented each one of us. As an initiate of
the profession, I had to come up with something adequate, even satisfying,
something that a lawyer might responsibly say or professionally do in the face of
such challenging matters. Simultaneously, I had to maintain my sense of myself
as a person, as a human being, as well as my sense of myself as a competent
professional. (Or else, if I did not maintain my self-conception under the
pressures exerted within this crucible of experience, then I had to explain to
myself this apparently irresistible impulse to change myself in the face of my
duties, both professional and personal.)
White put the challenge his book posed to its reader in the following way: “The
questions and assignments in this book ... are meant as occasions for the play of
the individual mind and imagination, as ... an independent mind.”8 What did I
make of these occasions?
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Seeing Law as an Art or Craft
I do not believe that I had ever worked out for myself in law school, or in the
beginnings of my legal practice, what I thought a lawyer was, or what a lawyer
did. Perhaps I had not done so because the matter never seemed an open
question (or was never put in question by anything I had encountered in law
school). Instead, the matter seemed settled. Well, what is the role or task of the
lawyer as a professional? I would say that one of the common attributes ascribed
to the lawyer in our society envisions the lawyer as a kind of “hired gun.” On this
view, a lawyer is a paid advocate who has learned certain complex and arcane
legal terms and rules, a professional who manipulates those terms and rules on
behalf of his client in order to reach a result favorable to that client. This makes
the lawyer’s task a technical job, one encompassing the techniques and tools of
the lawyer’s craft. There is enough truth to this view of a lawyer that it can be
very difficult to shake free of, or to modify and cabin within useful limits. Yet such
a view places the lawyer in relation to the law such that he or she is only a
technician, engaged in not much more than sophistic manipulation of legal words
and rules. A lawyer gets paid to use his or her tools at the behest of his or her
client, and the client’s payment puts the lawyer in a kind of literary serfdom or
servitude to the client.
If this portrait approximates the vision of lawyering that I brought to law school, I
do not believe that I was ever helpfully cautioned against it (certainly never
disabused of it) either during my career as a law student or during the opening
years of my practice. In my experience, this picture of the legal profession, or
something very close to it, was widely accepted. But White’s book explicitly
questioned this picture of what it is to be a legal professional, and his book even
countered this perhaps naïve conception by reconceiving the matter, and by
inviting me to imagine how I might proceed differently.
Today, almost forty years after the event, while there are aspects of my five-year
practice of law that are hazy or about which I have little or no memory, I still can
recall the revelatory impact I felt reading White’s suggestion “that law is not a
science—at least not the ‘social science’ some would call it—but an art. And this
course is directed to you as an artist.” 9 The lawyer an artist? Outrageous. Yet,
strangely appealing, too. Such a conception took seriously the notion that we
craft the law out of the materials we have at hand within the medium of (in my
case) the Anglo-American common law tradition. Could that claim be true; could
it be made plausible in the events and readings that would unfold in the pages to
follow? White seemed to think so: “There is no body of rules expressing the art of
the lawyer any more than that of the sculptor or painter. You are as free as they,
and as responsible for what you do. It is true that one of the mediums of the
lawyer’s art is rules, and the lawyer must know rules, and the other materials of
the law, as the sculptor must know clay and the painter paint and canvas.” 10 On
White’s portrayal, the artistry of the lawyer is bound to specific resources in
language and to specific ways of using language in formulating and expressing
4

one’s thoughts. (One instance is what we call “rules”; White frequently refers to
these media generically as various “forms of expression” used by lawyers.) The
lawyer is a writer who works in and through the medium of written and spoken
words. He or she uses texts and documents and rules and arguments and
speeches throughout his or her professional life. And White adds to this central
claim, several accompanying images in the book: such as, the judge as a kind of
poet and the judicial opinion as a kind of poem; legal writing as narrative, as
telling stories; statutes as setting the terms of cooperation among various people,
including the writer and the audience; the need to appeal to one’s imagination in
finding or thinking through a possible legal response to a concrete situation in the
world. These themes coalesce or aggregate to paint a portrait of the lawyer as an
artist working within a medium, a medium generally consisting of our language;
but, more specifically, a medium comprising its own literature of the law.
There is another challenge in all of this talk of artistry and craft, and Jim White
does not flinch from making that challenge explicit: “In asking you to define for
the moment the lawyer as writer, to regard yourself in that way, I am asking you
... to trust and follow your own curiosity; to work out in your imagination various
future possibilities for yourself.” 11 This remark puts the responsibility for our
professional development on our own shoulders, asking us to craft ourselves and
our careers out of the seemingly inert materials that the law makes available to
us as workers within the medium of the law. I am being asked how I as a lawyer
might relate myself and my concerns to the law and, through the law, to others,
including my clients. The Legal Imagination seemed to me to show its reader
possibilities of action and relationships the likes of which had not (in my
experience or knowledge) been imagined or portrayed in the legal literature prior
to its publication. So, White’s question remains pending: “What can I manage to
make out of these opportunities”?
The responsibility to respond fruitfully to this query rests with each of us
independent souls. “The activity which I mean to encourage in defining as I do
the lawyer as writer is an enterprise of the independent intelligence and
imagination.” 12 We are pinned to this duty even in our own independence, since
our independent status implies that we have an option, that we can decline the
invitation extended us by White, if we so choose.

Generating Law Out of Legal Media and Genres
White’s emphasis on our “independent” status can be misleading, if his remarks
are taken to betoken license without limits. Instead, White goes to great lengths
to remind us that, as with any artist, we are working within a given tradition and
within a given medium. Both of these make possible our making sense, but both
of these also condition (through limitation, by imposing limits upon us) what can
be said and meant in any particular place at any specific time. “What you must
ultimately learn is what to do with rules and judicial opinions and all the other
forms of expression that are the working stuff of a lawyer’s life, just as the
5

sculptor must learn what to do with clay and marble. You may feel that you are
constrained by your material, as indeed you are. But compare the pianist, who is
told what notes to play, in what order, how long and how loud; yet art is surely
possible there.” 13 Any tradition, as any medium, empowers us and constrains us
simultaneously. It is only because it does so that we can so much as utter a
meaningful sound or make a meaningful mark. Any act of liberation still
presumes or entails conditions for any further action—otherwise, it becomes
wantonness; and wanton action leads to nihilism and nullity, not to freedom of
expression that can be meaningful.
To show in detail how all of this takes place is beyond my capacity; there is a
sense in which nothing can substitute for the experience of working one’s way
through The Legal Imagination and seeing how things fit together, gaining
resonance and coherence as one goes. But I can instance one aspect of how
these matters work, as an example perhaps that might stand as a representative
for the rest of the experience to be had in reading and assimilating White’s book.
In saying that we are to consider “the lawyer as a special sort of writer,” 14 White
prepares us for his further characterization of the law as a kind of literature to
which the lawyer contributes and which the lawyer helps to create. Some readers
may take this to mean that law, given its basis in language, is susceptible to
being given a literary flair. But I take it that White intends his claim to carry us
deeper into the media of the law. For example, he wants us to think of judicial
opinions as being as much constructed out of words (and passages of words) as
are poems. This means that judicial opinions are literary constructs—they are
built by an author, and they are meant to be the way they are because of the
sequential construction given them by their author. And, too, White wants us to
see statutes as one way of establishing the terms of cooperation between the
statute’s writers and the statute’s readers (its audience), and to realize that
statutes are one possible device for organizing our future experience (and, thus,
our futures). All of this leads us to see the law as comprising a vast literature,
composed of diverse forms or genres: here a sequence of appellate court
opinions; there a series of trials and their transcripts; over there a number of
separate statutes, or perhaps a commodious codification of various legal rules
(something like the Uniform Commercial Code, deriving both from judicial
opinions and from statutory enactments); and yet further along a set of
administrative rules and regulations. All of these legal media and linguistic
formulations are types of legal material, created by authoritative bodies of the
state and its officers and agents. But, then, too, there are private sources of law
as well, generated by the work of individual private attorneys laboring on behalf
of their clients. So, we also have the opinion letter; the will; the trust deed or
indenture; the commercial contract; the real estate sales contract; the warranty
deed; the quit-claim deed; and so on. These are the instruments and documents
that lawyers use to make their meaning settled and clear; and to effect the
actions that their clients wish taken. These documents and instruments are the
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ways in which lawyers traditionally have found their voices, managing to say
what they mean and mean what they say.
It remains equally true, of course, that a substantial portion of the vitality of such
instruments and documents resides in the fact that their initial meaning is not—
and cannot be—their eventual or final meaning. Any good contract foresees that
an ongoing relationship between the parties to that contract (a lease of real
estate, for example, where landlord and tenant are bound to one another for the
course of the leasehold) invites, indeed requires, each party to return again and
again to the terms of this contractual relationship, renewing or revising those
terms and their envisioned relations to the extent that the parties have (and can
exercise) the energy, the vision, and the power to enact such renewal and
revision. The initial contract continues to live only in so far as it is reinvented and
reinvigorated.
How, specifically, does any of this meaningful activity take place? It exists in the
actual enactment of meaning within the instrumental or the documentary genres
that the Anglo-American common law tradition makes available to us. Law is an
activity of making meaning in concert with others through the use and recreation
(re-creation) of the forms of law inherited from the traditional linguistic and legal
media carried with us, generation after generation. 15
What I discovered, as a young lawyer in Chicago during the 1970s, is that, if we
view our legal forms and formulations as literary genres existing within the
medium of the law as literature, then it is possible to find vitality within such
confines. I do not say that this discovery is necessary or inevitable; only, that it is
possible. It happened for me, back then, back there, during those times in those
circumstances.
Viewing the law as literature, and taking the contracts that I was being asked to
draft, or the wills and trusts that I was seeking to create, as genres within which I
had the literary license (and constraint) to make my meaning manifest (and the
meaning of my client), the documents lived—and I thrived—as never before in
my short career as a lawyer. Perhaps more than anything else, I found that I had
been treating the inherited forms of the law (the forms in the form books, the
models in the law firm’s archives) as though they answered from the beginning
the legal problem confronting me. Or, perhaps it is more accurate to say that I
had thought of the form as though it were predesigned and predetermined to
solve problems that were already known and defined, already fixed and
determinate. In such a state of mind, however, there is no actual work remaining
for the lawyer to do, because both the problem, and the instrument (or the
document) responding to the problem, are taken to be settled. On such a
deadened understanding, the instruments or the documents did not require any
work or contribution from me, their supposed drafter, because the instruments or
documents already were known and finished, before I had even applied myself to
the matter at hand. A finished piece of work prior to the application of the artist’s
7

hand is a dead artifact. How can that be humanly interesting, engaging, or
enlivening work? Such a conception asks us as lawyers to do essentially nothing.
With the help of White’s instruction, and my self-tutelage gained from working
through the materials amassed in The Legal Imagination, I came to realize that
there was no preset or prescribed solution to any legal problem—until I had
fashioned it for myself, by myself, out of the materials the law made available to
me. The problems posed to me by my clients’ affairs and concerns were
pressingly real and unresolved, unless I had the professional wherewithal with
which to resolve those problems. So I needed to engage with the problems, and
with the genres available to me, in a creative way—that is, in a way that created
a solution for the problems posed. (I should note, to be sure, that my employing
law firm remained a community of colleagues. While my work contributed my
voice to the mix, my work in no way overrode or negated the fact that other
voices, other selves, would be added to the product of our collective activities as
lawyers in league with one another, exercising and expressing our collegial
judgements.)
One might think, reading the foregoing, that this is a very modest adjustment in
one’s view of the law, somehow making old forms come alive out of some
mysterious view of the law as a literary enterprise. I can only report what I know
(which is limited, I acknowledge). What from one angle can appear to be a
modest insight, a very slight alteration or variation of perception, still can mean a
lot to the person absorbing that insight or perception. (An analogous situation or
experience, perhaps, may be the way in which, in part II of the Philosophical
Investigations, 16 Wittgenstein asks us to look at a primitive drawing, first as a
duck, then as a rabbit; and the ensuing rapid vacillation between those two
equally possible ways of reading this primitive figure can seem—can be—
revelatory.) What I learned was that it was deadening for me to imagine that the
settled forms of the law (settled though they be) already solved the problems of
transacting business through a contract, say, or passing title to a house, or
devising one’s property at death. Instead, it was my business to unsettle the
forms and then re-settle them. I came to realize that I could make these things
happen for my clients—or fail to happen—only in so far as I designed the
document that way, with specific words, and warranties, and promises, or
limitations, and caveats, and the like. Nothing happened in the law for me or my
clients until I made it happen. And I could make it happen only by using the right
words in the correct document in the proper context or circumstances. What
made my words the “right” ones, or the document I used the “correct” one, or the
circumstances “proper” for my words and actions, was not something already
determined prior to my actions in engaging with these materials and fashioning
something adequate out of them. All of these deeply normative matters (of
rightness, correctness, propriety) were to be divined by me in my individual and
independent professional engagement with these matters and materials, always
in view of the interests and concerns expressed by my client. The competent
legal solution did not exist a priori in these forms or these genres or these
8

formulations; it could be made manifest only out of what I managed to create
through my mastery of these professional means and media.
This was my responsibility, and my professional doing—or undoing. I would have
to try it and see where it led me, whether I prospered or failed as a professional.

Learning How to Take Care of What One Has Started
For me, this book was a postgraduate form of education. After law school, this
was my introduction to lawyering as an art or craft. I learned the art of adding to
the literature of the law in a form that would be simultaneously my own
contribution, and yet also acceptable to the profession at large, recognizable by
other legal professionals as being a part of the professional literature, an addition
or contribution to the law as it exists at the time that one is trying to enter the
profession and become a dues-paying member.
What makes such an education possible at this stage in one’s life, when one has
finished with law school and is trying to make one’s way within the profession
itself? Or perhaps I should ask, “What makes it necessary”? In my epigram to
this essay, I reference a remark by Erik Erikson, which suggests that at a certain
stage in life there is a universal human need for coming to some understanding
of what one cares about most in life and how one intends to take care of that
passion. Erikson calls this need, “generativity.”
His is a term of art, so of course it collects meanings and associations in
Erikson’s work that are out of bounds in this essay. The term does suggest,
however, that Erikson is pointing to our human need to generate descendants,
people who (or things which) will succeed and survive us, who will carry on our
identity and our persona into the unknowable future. Plato famously spoke of our
writings as being attempts by human beings to achieve immortality, as our
progeny (in a sense). Legal documents and legal instruments, too, reach into the
future and outlive their drafter, their creator. Are they an attempt to grasp legal
immortality? I wonder.
In this essay, I have been sketching in brief my own journey of generativity. In my
case, “generativity” stands for the ability of a person to generate recognizably
authentic legal instruments and documents, ones that speak to the difficulties
and complexities of life in which the lawyer and his or her clients find themselves.
In this regard, finding the ability to generate my own responses to matters
presented to me, responses at once individual and also credited (if not always
wholly accepted) by other legal professionals, was how I came to fulfill this
universal human need in my own career as a lawyer.
This discovery for myself of a way in which to practice authentically a life in the
profession of law within the American common law system had several important
implications (or consequences). I might try to specify, in closing, what some of
9

those implications and consequences were, in terms recalling Herbert
Fingarette’s observation on how a human being comes to take responsibility for
something in his or her life: “In truth, acceptance, commitment, concern are
aspects of what, from a different vantage point, may be seen as conduct which
realizes in the concrete the possibilities defined by the socially given forms. It is,
one discovers, a matter of emphasis and not of separate existence.” 17
Having gone through law school, I had inherited the “socially given forms” of the
Anglo-American common law tradition. But I had not accepted them, I had not
realized concretely their manifold possibilities, in my practice of law, until I had
struggled with those forms for two years or more, and then had come into fruitful
contact with The Legal Imagination, with its wonderful yet daunting challenges for
its reader.
One consequence was that I came to understand that professional work is still
my own work as a person—something that I possess and for which I am
responsible—in a way more direct and immediate than I had previously thought.
Taking it personally was my way of taking my work professionally. Yes, the law
imposes constraints on me. Yes, there are limits to what I, or any lawyer, can do
with the law. Yes, I am bound by the conventions, rules, principles, and
precedents of our legal system. Yet the same is true of the artist. He too is
constrained by his medium of words or paint or plaster or whatever. He too is
limited as to what he can do or achieve with his materials. He too is bound by
fidelity to the conventions, rules, principles, and precedents, histories, and
traditions, of his art, his profession. Still, to say this—any or all of it—is not to
excuse us from acting, from having to act effectively as a lawyer or an artist.
Rather, it pins us down exactly to our responsibilities to act as a professional
lawyer or professional artist does. These constraints, these limits, these bonds,
define us exactly, us and our position, from which we must act. The challenge to
action, the duty to act, is the same for lawyer and artist: what can he or she do
from within this particular set of circumstances and with these materials?
Law as an art implies both that the practice of law bears a certain kind of relation
to the media and materials in which it takes place, and that it itself constitutes a
kind of human activity, a species of human action. As to these two points, I
simply wish to say the following. The relation of the lawyer to his or her media
and materials is a reciprocal one, by which I mean that legal materials serve and
create (re-create) the lawyer just as he serves and creates (re-creates) them.
What these materials are and can become (what they mean) is in part dependent
upon what the lawyer makes of them, and makes them be and mean. And vice
versa: what the lawyer is and can become (what he or she means) is in part
dependent upon what these media and materials make of him or her, and make
him or her be and mean. Each unsettles the other, and then seeks re-settlement;
this is one aspect of what it means to become, to be, a member of a learned
profession.
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Before I had read Jim White’s book, I had allowed myself to be dictated to by the
legal forms I had used. In this respect, I placed myself outside the law. I was
subject to its dictates, but I was not one of its initiates; I was not an insider with
an insider’s knowledge of how things worked within the profession. What seems
wrong with the view of law as being a structure of inflexible techniques and tools
and rules that one must learn, and then to which one must conform as one learns
to manipulate them in argument, is that the law student or young lawyer, on this
view, is external to the law.
What is wrong with this view of law is not that it subordinates us to the law in a
certain sense—because I think that this implication or suggestion, rightly
understood, is accurate. Correctly understood, we are servants of the law,
perfect indentured servants working off the indenture we have freely imposed
upon ourselves by becoming initiates of the profession. It is bigger than we are—
yet it lives through us. We become a contributor by further fashioning and
enriching the medium of the law, the institution of the law, of which we are a part.
This form of servitude is not enacted toward a client or the interests of a client, so
much as it enacts a form of servitude to a tradition and an institution, a medium
of thought and expression. This form of servitude is not the kind of servitude to a
client that the “lawyer-as-hired-gun” vision of law implies for the law student or
lawyer. Even in its depiction of “manipulation” of the law, one does not gain a
sense from the latter of an artist immersing himself or herself in the medium of
the law and working from within to fashion a solution to a given legal problem.
White’s book portrays the practice of law differently. The voices in which lawyers
may speak, and the forms of speech in which their vocables take shape and
resonance, are multifarious. White’s book seems to me to release to us the
knowledge that, most often in a legal dispute, there is a range of acceptable
results, a range of acceptable readings or interpretations, a range of acceptable
strategies. Not just any expression, and not every instrument, will count as law;
not just any remark, or any document, will serve a legal function. But more than
one can count as legally recognizable, more than one can serve a legal function.
The law does not force you as a student or a practitioner into a straitjacket,
unless you yourself insist on trying on such a jacket for size and parading around
in it.
This indicates a second strand of White’s work that influenced me. His vision of
law as an art throws you back on yourself, as the primary or initial (but not the
sole or final) touchstone for the adequacy and persuasiveness of your legal
judgments. You yourself are the generator and judge of your work as a lawyer.
Rightly understood, this thought again increases one’s responsibility. The more
autonomy over one’s work that is permitted, then the more one becomes
answerable for everything he or she does.
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White’s vision of the law places the responsibility for each professional’s growth
and maturation squarely where it belongs, on his or her own head and shoulders.
What can each of us manage to generate from such a position?
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